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Japanese Development and Iranian Uneven Development: A Gramscian
Perspective
Abstract
Why Iran is underdeveloped and significantly dominated by imperial Western powers has been debated
among Iranian intellectuals for more than a century. Japan’s rise in the late 19th/early 20th centuries and
its defeat of Russia in 1904-5 made it something of a model that Iran might follow in order to catch up
with the developed capitalist world. Approaches which focus on this have been essentially liberal and
“cultural” in nature. The aim of the current study is to re-examine the question of Iranian
underdevelopment, using Gramsci’s heritage to compare the actual contexts and material/historical roots
of Japanese development and Iranian underdevelopment. That is, to suggest the Japanese indigenous
programme to develop the country was not significantly interrupted by foreign imperial powers. However,
in the Iranian case, the emergence of multiple historical blocs and their progressive agendas were
repeatedly interrupted and defeated by the dominating imperial powers, namely Britain, Russia and, from
the mid-20th century onwards, the United States. The comparison between the two historical cases of
Iran and Japan indicate that the global economic system played a crucial role in shaping the development
of Japan and the uneven development/underdevelopment of Iran.
::چکیده
چرایی عقبماندگی ایران در مقابل توسعهیافتن کشوری چون ژاپن از آغاز قرن بیستم وارد محافل ایرانی شد.
شکست روسیه تزاری از ژاپن درحالیکه بارها ایران را در امتداد قرن نوزدهم شکست داده بود ،راه مقایسه ایران با
کشور ژاپن را درمیان پژوهشهای داخل ایران باز کرد .گرایشات »فرهنگی« برای تحلیل چرایی توسعهنیافتن ایران
درمقایسه با ژاپن در میان پژوهشهای ایرانی بسیار غالب است .از این جهت در این بررسی برای دست یافتن به
تحلیلی دقیقتر به رویکردهای انتقادی توسعه روی آوردهایم .در این رویکرد به دنبال چرایی عقب ماندگی ایران
درمقایسه با ژاپن بر اساس مفاهیم »بلوک تاریخی« و » انقالب عقیم« که توسط اندیشمند مارکسیست ایتالیایی آنتونیو
گرمشی مطرح شده اند تکیه کردهایم .با بررسی دو برهه مهم تاریخی »اصالحات میجی« در ژاپن و »انقالب مشروطه«
در ایران خواهیم گفت که چگونه دخالتهای امپریالیستی روسیه و انگلستان منجر به عقیم شدن جنبش مشروطه در
ایران به عنوان یک بلوک تاریخی شکل گرفته ،شد و درمقابل در غیاب دخالتهای موثر خارجی چگونه ژاپن توانست در
قالب انقالب میجی توسعه بومی خویش را پیش برد و بلوک شکلگرفته چگونه قادر شد هژمونی خود را بهصورتی
نوین تثبیت کند .پس از جنگ جهانی دوم نظم جهانی آمریکایی در راستای تثبیت هژمونی خود به کمک کشور ژاپن
شتافت و موجب شد ژاپن قادر به بازسازی ویرانی های جنگ و رشد دوباره گردد .اما در مقابل بلوک تاریخی شکل
گرفته در ایران برای ملی کردن صنعت نفت به رهبری محمد مصدق قربانی دخالتهای هژمونیک دو قدرت انگلستان و
آمریکا شد و با کودتای  ۲۸مرداد و حذف نیروهای مترقی ایران به نام مبارزه با کمونیسم دوباره در امتداد قرن بیستم
به سرنوشت »عقیم« دچار شد .درواقع برخالف تحلیلهای لیبرال و فرهنگی این تحلیل ساختاری از جایگاه ایران به
.عنوان یک کشور حاشیهای درمقابل مرکزیت ژاپن در جهان است که توانایی پاسخ به چرایی عقبماندگی ایران را دارد
کلیدواژهها :ایران ،ژاپن ،توسعه ،عقب ماندگی ،بلوک تاریخی ،انقالب عقیم ،هژمونی ،نظم جهانی ,آنتونیو گرمشی
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Japanese Development and Iranian Uneven
Development: A Gramscian Perspective
Marziyeh Asgarivash and Karim Pourhamzavi
1. Introduction
Debates on why Iran is economically, socially and politically
relatively under-developed have occupied a significant part of
mainstream Iranian discourse during the twentieth and early 21st
centuries. Japan, on the other hand, as a developed and powerful
Asian State, has occupied an important place in the Iranian
literature and debate on development. This was particularly true
after its defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5. The
Japanese victory over Russia contrasted sharply with Iran’s loss of
some 250,000 square kilometres of its northern territories to
Russian forces in the early 19th century and its subordination to
Russian power until the early 20th century.
However, similar to most of the discourse which has linked
underdevelopment in Iran to problems arising from Iranian culture,
the dominant debate among Iranian scholars about the Japanese
model has taken a “cultural approach”. That is, the Japanese were
able to achieve a developed economy because they had a “culture”
more amenable to supporting such development, compared to the
Iranians. Therefore, it is common to find Iranian-based studies that
highlight education, religion, tradition, individual characteristics and
so on as main factors behind Japanese development. Take, for
instance, a recent study on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic
policies and recent “development” in Japan (Yari and Bayazidi,
2017, pp. 65-84). In this article, factors such as “loyalty of the
individuals to the Emperor and the State”, “individual justice”, and
Japanese “respect and politeness” have been taken as elements
behind development. An alternative approach suggests that
“societies act based on their thoughts [culture] not in accordance
with their material resources” (Naqi Zadeh 2005, p. 28). Therefore,
Confucian thinking, nationalism and the borrowing of Western
ideas are depicted as being at the heart of Japanese development
and giving it “moral supremacy over the rest of the Asian nations”
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(ibid., p. 44). These two examples are part of a broader liberal
umbrella which dominates current Iranian economic-political
discourse.
The domination of liberal and cultural approaches in economicpolitical debates in Iran also indicate the underdevelopment of
critical studies in this regard. The current paper, therefore, attempts
to emphasise the importance of critical studies by offering a
comparison between Iran and Japan based on two periods: that of
the late 1800s/early 1900s and then the period following WWII. As
part of developing a critical approach, the paper incorporates into
its framework some important ideas derived from Gramsci.
First, we shed light on two historical developments that led to
the emergence and re-emergence of Japan as a developed capitalist
and imperial power in the second half of the 19th century and after
the Second World War, when it recovered quickly from its defeat
and devastation by the United States and its allies. The Iranian case
will be examined based on the same historical periods. We argue
that, in the case of Japan, the progressive transition (revolution) was
not retarded by foreign and imperial powers and therefore was
successful in establishing a modern and highly developed capitalist
hegemony. Even in the post-WW II period, the United States
hegemonic interest did not retard Japanese development – indeed,
it helped facilitate the modernization of the political system and
revive and further develop the country. This was mainly due to the
need to establish successful capitalist bulwarks against the spread of
communism in Asia, especially after the 1949 Chinese revolution.
In contrast, the attempts at progressive transitions, led by multiple
organic social forces, in Iran met the fate of “passive revolutions”
in both the early 20th century and post-WW II periods. These were
mainly due to interventions of imperial forces such as Britain and
Russia, and later the United States (US), which, based on their own
imperial interests, changed the course of Iranian history. Underdevelopment in Iran, therefore, owes its existence to the country’s
subordination to imperial powers, as a peripheral country, rather
than to its “culture”.
2. Development in Japan and Uneven Development in Iran
Before they become the intellectual discourse of the Iranian
bourgeoisie, cultural approaches to understanding underdevelop-
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ment in this country are ideologically imported from the hegemonic
Western powers. The famous perspective of Orientalism, suggested
by Edward Said, is classic in this regard. Said pursued the root of
this perspective which depicts the inferiority of Eastern cultures visa-vis the supremacy of Western culture from the late eighteenth
century and the first colonial contact of the French with Egypt
(Said 2003). In a recent study, Govand Azeez examines the Western
historical framing of Middle Eastern revolutions and progressive
transitions from Al-Mahdi’s revolution in the second half of the
19th century to the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Azeez finds that these
movements were depicted as “illiberal”, “undemocratic” and
“Islamist” and eventually “regressive” rather than “progressive”(Azeez 2014 pp. 64-86). Therefore, there seems to be no
positive-sum game assumed by the West for the problematic culture of
peripheral Middle Eastern States. Whether static or in a movement
towards a revolution, Middle Eastern culture is the main factor
behind Middle Eastern underdevelopment.
Moreover, approaches such as that suggested by Harvard
historian David Landes are also popular among the proponents of
the cultural approach in Iran. The key solution that Landes
proposes to the developing States is to amend their culture, based
on the successful Western model, in order to achieve and enjoy the
same development that the First World capitalist States enjoy
(Landes 1998). Therefore, based on Landes’ theoretical framework,
those nations which have not yet achieved development either have
not copied the Western model or they have not copied it enough.
The characteristics of the cultural approach can be seen as subbranches of what Robert Cox has named “problem-solving
theories”.1 Accordingly, the cultural approach is reductionist, given
that it reduces the complexity of some 200 years of British, Russian
and American hegemony over the Iranian socio-economic and
political structure, and the impact and the uneven development that
this hegemony leaves behind, to mere local culture. Therefore, the
cultural approach is ahistorical in method and lacking in overall
context. Its positivist criteria simply does not work when subjected
to structural and critical examination. To remain within the critical

1 For a debate on the characteristics of Problem-Solving Theories as opposed to Critical
Theories, see Cox 1981, pp. 126-55.
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framework suggested by Cox, the cultural approach is the ideology
of the status quo for maintaining the status quo (ibid).2
The main issue with the pro-status quo approaches in relation to
Iran is that they do not offer a perspective by which the underdevelopment in this society can be comprehended. In a sense, the
cultural approaches constitute an epistemological dead-end in
Iranian development-related discourse. This is precisely where the
intervention of critical theory can also be understood as providing
an epistemological balance. To fulfil such a task, we build upon
Antonio Gramsci’s thought to offer a theoretical model in which
both Japanese development and Iranian underdevelopment can be
comprehended.
Gramsci’s name is most famously associated with the term
“hegemony”. However, it is the process of achieving hegemony or
the failure of such achievement that provides a perspective in which
different kinds of States, their development and underdevelopment
can be comprehended. Gramsci depicted two political structures,
rather superstructures, in the modern era. One is a hegemonic
structure in which the ruling élite rely primarily on consent as a
means to rule, while the other is a non-hegemonic structure which
survives mainly through coercive means.3 The first kind of States
are the capitalist developed, or First World, States; the other are the
underdeveloped peripheral, or Third World, States (Cox 1983, pp.
162-75).
Hegemony is a dialectical product of clashes between social
forces and the superstructure of a specific society. To quote Augelli
and Murphy, “It should be clear that in employing Gramsci’s theory
to analyse IR (international relations) we are forced to learn a great
deal about society” (Augelli and Murphy 1993 p. 138). The dynamic
of the clashes between society and its superstructure takes place
within, and through the leadership of, a historical bloc.4 Gramsci
Ibid.
Given his special circumstances – being in a Fascist prison – Gramsci reflected on the two
different kinds of States in fragmented writing. For a detailed historical discussion in this
regard, see: Gramsci, 1971, pp. 123-205 (i.e. the section based largely on the “special”
Notebook 13 on Machiavelli, with additions from elsewhere in the Notebooks – editorial note).
4 Our use of the term “historical bloc” here goes beyond a mere alliance of ‘social forces’ and
should not therefore be confused as the outcome merely of negotiations and alliances of political forces around a specific political goal or programme. Rather, it is the collision between
the structure and superstructure that is meant as an overall context in which social forces,
classes and alliances lead a specific progressive transition toward a new era which
fundamentally changes the State as it used to be known.
2
3
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noted that material needs and common causes bring together different social forces – for instance, the economic élite, the intelligentsia, the religious, the urban poor and the peasantry – under a
common banner toward a progressive transition (Gramsci 1971, pp.
123-205).5 This Gramscian theorization of revolution, as it can be
observed in developed States, succeeds when a historical bloc leads
a progressive transition, ends a period of historical stagnation and
builds its hegemony over the ruins of the old regime. The transformation of England from a feudal to a capitalist political power
structure, initially through the civil war between monarchy and
parliament in the 1640s and the French Revolution in 1789 are
examples of historical blocs that successfully led a progressive
transition toward establishing new hegemony for new ruling élites.
As will be discussed, the Japanese historical bloc in the late 19th
century and its transition to industrial capitalism will be viewed as a
successful establishment of a new hegemony. Yet the same thing
cannot be said about peripheral States; their new, modernizing
historical blocs fail to accomplish a progressive transition and
therefore are unable to replace old regimes with their own
hegemony (Gramsci 1971, p. 105; [original] Gramsci 1975, Q15§59,
pp. 1822-3). In this part of the world, otherwise known as the
Global Periphery,6 we witness the underdevelopment which
resulted from capitalist development in the Global Core. One way
to implement this dynamic is to undermine the progressive
transitions which are undertaken in the Global Periphery by the
Core States. The dramatic fate of “passive revolution”, to use
Gramsci’s term, is a feature of uneven development in the Global
Periphery (Gramsci 1971 p. 59; Gramsci 1975, Q19§24, p. 2011).
Nineteenth-century Italy and the Risorgimento reformist
movements were Gramsci’s own examples for passive revolution.
Gramsci argued that the Risorgimento was so predominantly
influenced by the French Revolution at the level of ideas that its
historical bloc was distorted: it attracted intellectuals but lacked
other vital social forces such as an organic economic élite (Gramsci
pp. 116-7: Gramsci 1975, Q10II§61, p. 1360). In the current study
we view the Iranian historical blocs in the early and mid-20th
See footnote 3 (above).
In the 1960s and 1970s, these countries were often referred to as the Third World because of
their position at the bottom of the global pecking order. The term was not pejorative; indeed,
it was usually used by partisans of these countries and their liberation movements.
5
6
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century as attempted progressive transitions which were defeated
by the British, Russian and then American imperial powers and
eventually became converted into passive revolutions.
Gramsci’s ideas have attracted much attention in multi-disciplinary fields of studies, most notably the International Political Economy school which came to be known as the neo-Gramscian school.
In this regard, Robert Cox suggested a Gramscian model in which
hegemony can be understood beyond national borders and at a
global level. As we learn from Cox, the established hegemony in an
industrial capitalist State such as Britain surpasses the national
boundaries to globally serve the interests of the British ruling élites
through the establishment of global hegemony. A global hegemonic
power would need to shape a world order, and the coercive-consent
process of making sure that other States follow, in order to maintain hegemony (Cox 1983). The sphere of hegemony includes allies
and alliances which have their own vested interests to advance via
agreeing to participate in the world order and maintaining it by
accepting the role of the hegemon (Cox 1987, p. 215). This is an
additional theoretical framework to realize the development of a
State such as Japan in relation to either its own organicallydeveloped capitalism or in alliance with the hegemon, and therefore
beneficial to hegemony, as was the case in the post-WW II period,
especially at the height of the Cold War. The absence of such a
privilege for the majority of the peripheral States in a specific world
order also helps explain continuing underdevelopment in States
such as Iran.
Accordingly, both Iran and Japan function within and are
affected by the same international system, but in totally different way.
It is this historical materialist perspective, as Adam Morton reminds
his readers, that is at the core of the Gramscian perspective which
views history as always a “world history” in which the part is
affected (whether positively or negatively) by the whole.7 Our
analysis therefore sees uneven development in Iran as a result of
international political and economic relations and capitalist
development in imperial States such as Britain, Russia and the
United States.

7 For the notion of uneven development in Gramsci’s work and its use to analyse the dynamic
of the Global North-Global South relationship, see Morton 2007, pp. 2-7.
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3. Japan
3a. The country in the nineteenth century
A century after European expansion into the Americas and the
emergence of a colonial mode of accumulation, Japan was subject
to a civil war in the late 16th century. As a result, the Ashikaga
shogunate8 regime was replaced by the Tokugawa shogunate
(Frédéric 2002, p. 978). The latter was in charge of the Japanese
feudal system, although with loose and decentralized control, for
over two centuries. The Japanese social structure in this period
encompassed the feudal lords who were closely linked to, and
traditional allies of, the Tokugawa ruling élites; the Samurai, who
constituted a military and warrior caste; and the peasantry, who
were viewed suspiciously by the other three social groups. The
peasants, for instance, would not be incorporated into the military
force, out of the fear that they might become powerful enough to
challenge the establishment (Kennon 2012, p. 18). However, by the
mid-19th century, the liberal world order and its economic system
both began to make their presence felt in Japan.
By the 1850s, Japan was subject to pressure from Western
imperial forces active in Asian waters, most notably the USA, to
open up for trade. The Japanese accepted the 1854 Treaty of
Kanagawa which was imposed by the US to grant the latter trade
concessions (Hunter 1999, p. 5). Ironically, the US ended Japanese
isolationism while itself having a conscious and sophisticated
protectionist economic regime. Agreements between Japan and
other European powers such as Britain, Russia and the Netherland
followed the US-Japanese treaty (ibid.). By the end of the 1850s the
weakness of the Japanese ruling élite and their subordination to
Western powers was accompanied by a fear of peasant rebellion.
Various disadvantaged social groups emerged within a historical
bloc to spark a revolution in 1868, the Meiji Restoration. The
Emperor Meiji was supported by part of the ruling élite which were
in opposition to the previous order. The Samurai, who at this stage
were shifting from their military role to becoming entrepreneurs,
supported the Meiji industrialization policy (Rajabzade, p. 25). The
peasants too became de facto supporters of the Meiji revolution.
They were subject to exploitation for mostly agricultural production
8 A title granted by the Emperor to a military governor which was common in the Japanese
administration system.

9

International Gramsci Journal No. 11 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Winter /Inverno 2019

during the Tokugawa era and were kept marginalized by the feudal
élite.9 Similar to Iran in 1906, which will be discussed below, the
Japanese historical bloc succeeded in establishing a new government. However, unlike the Iranian case, the Japanese government
also succeeded in leading the progressive transition in Japan.
Accordingly, from ending feudalism to leading investment in areas
such as railways, mines, shipping and textiles, the Japanese government paved the way for the emergence of industrial capitalism
(Stearns 1993, pp. 113-29). Therefore, the Japanese historical bloc,
in the Gramscian sense, succeeded in establishing its hegemony.
Japan escaped the fate of being reduced to a peripheral State and,
by the beginning of the 20th century, was establishing itself as a
major power.
While Japan was briefly dominated by the capitalist forces of the
global economic system, unlike the entire Middle East or China10 it
was never taken over by foreign powers or, like Iran, indirectly
colonized. This also means that the logic of the dialectical evolution
and transition from primitive economy to feudal and from there to
capitalist economy was not disturbed or disrupted in the Japanese
case. In the words of Gramsci when commenting on the Japanese
intellectuals, “In Japan we have a formation of the English and
German type [of intellectuals], that is an industrial civilization that
develops within a feudal-bureaucratic integument with unmistakable features of its own” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 22-3: original Gramsci
1975, Q12§1, p. 1529). To refer to categories used by Alexander
Gerschenkron, Japan introduced a government-led approach to
capitalism in the 19th century. While the British model involved the
emergence of an organic capitalist élite and the German-Austrian
approach relied on banks to finance the emergence of industrial
capitalism, the Japanese, and to some extent the pre-1917 Russian
model as well, relied on conscious / planned governmental
programmes to develop a capitalist industrial base (Gerschenkron
1965). These developments provided the background for the
Russo-Japanese war in 1904.
For the Japanese peasants as an object of suspicion for the feudal élite, see Kennon 2012.
Japan also observed the European powers and the US humiliating and exploiting China and
were determined to escape that fate. While these powers were busy in China, Japan had a
window of opportunity to modernize economically and even became one of the powers
picking apart China.
9

10
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Japan emerged as an imperial power and a Core State, particularly within East Asia, with its victory over China in 1894-95 and
Russia in 1904-05. With its territorial expansion into China and
Korea on the Asian mainland, Japan became a directly colonial
power as well (Smith 1998, pp. 41-2). By the Second World War it
was a major global power and a key protagonist.
3b. The Re-emergence of Japan
Similar reasons to the ones that allowed the emergence of Japan
as an industrial and military power in the second half of the 19th
century contributed to its re-emergence as a major economic power
in the post-WWII / Cold War era. Japan did not face major external
resistance to the Meiji Restoration and the policy of industrialization. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the imperatives of US
global hegemony led successive American governments to rebuild
capitalist Japan (Panitch and Gindin 2012, pp. 203-4). This runs
totally contrary to the treatment that peripheral States such as Iran
have received at the hands of the major western powers.
The Second World War changed inter-State relations and most
notably formally ended British hegemony. The new US institutional
power ‘to take the helm in a project for making capitalism global’
was shaping the post-WWII world while most of its allies and rivals
(especially Britain, France, Japan and Germany) had been
substantially weakened by the war (Panitch and Gindin 2012, p. 7).
The rise of the American hegemony differed from its earlier British
counterpart, partially in its reliance on multilateralism.11 This meant
that multiple international organizations were to be established and
installed in key roles by the US as mechanisms of its hegemony (cf.
Cox 1981). These included the World Bank (July 1945), United
Nations (1945) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 1945. Multilateral cooperation within the above-mentioned
mechanisms of hegemony was mainly among capitalist allies. The
apex of the ‘American rescue of the European capitalist States’ in a
pathway toward a hegemonic bloc based on American leadership
was the Marshall Plan of 1948. Mostly indebted to the US even
before WWII, and devastated as the result of that war, the
European allies would not be able to recover without America’s
11

For a more in-depth discussion, see Gill 1990, pp. 90-5.
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financial support. To quote Keynes on post-WWII Britain, ‘our
post-war domestic policies are impossible without American
assistance’. Japan was included in the rescue pack.
Apart from building a new capitalist global economy, the
American-led Western bloc was also meant to isolate the Soviet
Union – and, after 1949, China. The hegemonic alliance was also
successful in overcoming the effects of the pre-WWII Great
Depression. The recovery of global capitalism was celebrated by
another multilateral alliance, namely the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) founded in 1960, also to
help ensure US hegemony (Cox 1987, p. 216). This included
Canada and Japan – the latter having already benefited from a
rebuild package parallel to the Marshall Plan. The new economic
order was so beneficial and crucial to the re-emergence of the US
capitalists’ allies that they willingly accepted US hegemony rather
than a real partnership.
The Japanese route to re-emergence involved various stages in
which the United States played the role of a subsidizer. Japan joined
the World Bank in 1952 and soon became the biggest debtor client
after India. Between 1946 and 1950 the US provided $1.95 billion
in aid packs to Japan to prevent shortages in food and other
essential goods. In these years, the Japanese economy was heavily
reliant internally on State subsidies and externally on American aid
(Halliday 1976, pp. 29-30). This aid to the Japanese economy
continued; until 1970 US investment in Japan was 6.5 times larger
than Japanese investment in the US (Halliday 1976, pp. 264-5).
Accordingly, even after the massive destruction of Japan in WWII,
the absence of pacifying elements on the one hand and the positive
role of the very element (imperial foreign forces) that retarded and
distorted development in Iran contributed to the re-emergence of
Japan as a developed capitalist economy.
4. Iran
4a. The Constitutional ‘Passive’ Revolution
Iran owes its title of a “peripheral State” to when it was first
incorporated into the global economic system in the early 19th
century. Over a century of military defeat and humiliation, semifeudal economic stagnation, dysfunctional and rather decentralized
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government and famine inherently resulting from the Iranian
political-economic subordination to the British and Russian
imperial forces became the platform for the emergence of an
Iranian historical bloc in the late 19th century. The movement
sparked by this historical bloc is widely known as the Constitutional
Revolution which formally succeeded in establishing a parliament in
1906. Reflecting on the diversity of the social forces and components of this Iranian historical bloc Janet Afary states:
The Constitutional Revolution was made possible through an initial hybrid
coalition of forces, which included liberal reformers, members of the ulama
[the clergy], merchants, shopkeepers, students, trade guildspeople, workers,
and radical members of secret societies who promoted the formation of an
assembly of delegates and a constitution (Afary 1994, p. 21).

The Constitutional Revolution is also the first modern Iranian
movement in which women participated, protesting against the
status quo along with the men (Abrahaman 2015, p. 57). The
Revolution eventually forced the monarch, Muzafaraldin, to sign a
constitution that would limit the absolute powers of himself and his
heir and create a democratically-elected government in 1906.
The Iranian attempt at a progressive transition was soon compromised, however, by the two dominant imperial forces, namely
Britain and Russia. The process of pacifying the Constitutional
Revolution started just a few months later when Iran was divided
into two areas of influence by the Anglo-Russian Convention of
1907 (Abrahamian 2010, p. 98). As a result, the new Iranian parliament was bombarded by Russian artillery, newspapers were banned,
250 people were killed and some of those arrested were executed
without trial (Foran 2013, pp. 292-5). In short, Iran was punished
for doing something that the British had just achieved through the
civil war of the 1640s, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and then
the extension of the franchise for men in the mid-1800s – democracy, at least for men, and the removal of absolute monarchy.
The revolutionists fought back, but unsuccessfully. The years
between 1906 and 1911 were years of social mobilization in an
effort to restore the Parliament. However, the second Parliament
was dissolved by an ultimatum jointly issued by Russia and Britain.
A massacre of the revolutionists followed the dissolution of the
Parliament in 1911, thus the slogan of “independence or death”,
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became prominent for decades to come (Abrahamian 1982, p. 109).
Given the role of imperial British and Russian forces in Iran, the
Constitutional Revolution became a passive revolution in 1911 and
this tragedy led to a decade of political instability and conflict, social
disintegration, famine and finally the emergence of a Bonapartist
modernizer, or what Gramsci refers to as Caesarism, namely Reza
Khan, later Reza Shah, in the 1920s.
4b. The American World Order and the Impact on Iran
Contrary to Japan, the post-WWII passive revolution in Iran set
off another wave of uneven (under)development in the country. Unlike Japan, Iran had a neutral position in WWII, although this did
not prevent an alliance of the United States, Britain and the Soviet
Union from occupying it in 1941. Different motivations inspired
the different States involved in this violent occupation. Britain
wanted to send troops to directly protect the oil it was exploiting in
Southern Iran, oil which played a crucial role for the British in the
war (Foran 2013, pp. 406-7). The US aimed at using the recentlybuilt Iranian railroad and other infrastructure to aid the Soviets
fighting the Germans. Similar to the Russian tsars, Stalin was divided between claiming the Iranian territories which the Red Army
occupied in Northern Iran, establishing secessionist proxies to fight
for the Soviets, and claiming oil concessions granted by the Iranian
government in 1947 (Bose 1972, p. 2). The occupation itself in
1941 put an end to Reza Shah’s project of indigenous nation-State
building, modernization and industrialization.12 Accordingly, the
Shah was forced to abdicate and sent into exile by the occupation
forces, and his 18-year-old son was installed as the next monarch.
The Caesarism of Reza Shah was itself a product of an historical
bloc which had been defeated and pacified by the occupying imperial forces in 1941. However, the years between 1950 and 1953
witnessed the emergence of another historical bloc in Iran to lead
the process of progressive transition. The highly exploitative nature
Reza Shah can, in many senses, be compared to the Viceroy Mohamed Ali in Egypt and his
modernizing project in the early 19th century. Samir Amin considers Mohamed Ali’s programme of development to be the first in ‘the periphery of globalised capitalism’, predating
those of Japan and China. Amin also concludes that the root of the Egyptian failure in this
period must be sought in “foreign aggression by Great Britain” which officially occupied
Egypt in 1882 after years of domination. See Amin 2016, pp. 21-2.
12
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of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was a source of concern for all Iranian governments after the discovery of oil by the
British subject William Knox D’Arcy in the South (Reguer 1982, p.
134). However, it was under the leadership of the National Front,
which worked as an umbrella to contain various nationalist and
leftist political groups and parties along with the clergy to support
the elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh, that Iran’s
struggle with AIOC developed.13 Backed by both the Parliament
and the National Front, Mossadegh declared Iranian oil to be
national property and stopped AIOC operations in the country
after the latter refused to negotiate a better deal that took Iranian
concerns into account. Seeing the decline of British hegemony and
the rise of American power, the Iranian government even proposed
a partnership with the US, based on similar enterprises between
American corporations and the Saudis (Siavoshi 1994, pp. 106-34).
What distinguished American corporations such as Standard Oil of
California, which were already partners with the AIOC, from the
British corporations was that the Americans were willing to share
50 percent of the oil revenue with producing States such as Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela.
Mossadegh and the historical bloc of the early 1950s were
betrayed by the Americans who acted alongside their British partners. Over a period of six months, the CIA and MI6 prepared a
coup which removed Mossadegh from office on August 19, 1953.14
Once more in the 20th century, an Iranian progressive transition was
turned into passive revolution by the hegemonic imperial forces –
in the first instance, Britain and Russia; in the second, the United
States and Britain – in their own interests. Unsurprisingly, the
defeat in 1953 also set the conditions for decades of uneven
economic, social and political development, including the turmoil
of 1979 which resulted in a theocratic regime.
Iran had entered WWII with an occupation by the dominating
imperial powers. There had been the beginning of a break, under
the Mossadegh government, as post-war economic hardship drove
the Mossadegh reforms, including the proposal to nationalize the
oil industry. The 1953 coup ended the possibility of an alternative
13 For more in-depth discussion about the diversity of the social forces which supported the
National Front, see Abrahamian 2018, pp. 210-17 (Farsi).
14 For a detailed discussion of the coup which became known as Operation Ajax in CIA
documents, see: Kinzer 2003, p. 2.
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economic course and the rest of the 1950s amounted to years of
economic stagnation. There was certainly consistent American
economic aid to Iran, estimated to be $366.8 million for the period
between 1953-57 (Richards 1975, pp 3-22, 24, 26.) but this was not
at all similar to US economic aid and other help provided to Japan,
a country which had more the status of a hegemonic partner. After all,
the 1953 coup violently denied Iran the deal it needed to plan its
own economy. Regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran were
needed to be economically stable to help contain the Soviet Union
in the Middle East during the Cold War. Saudi Arabia was also
granted similar economic aid by the US and the UK during the
1940s when the State witnessed a decline in the number of the
pilgrims who were at that time the State’s main source of revenue
(Cleveland and Bunton 2009, p. 233). The other – and less told –
side of the story of Washington’s economic aid to Iran in the 1950s,
however, was that the US, along with international organizations
such as the World Bank, dictated a ‘comprehensive national
development plan’ to Iranian governments and the CIA checked
almost every media outlet and educational programme in Iranian
schools to make sure that ‘American interests’ were met during the
Cold War (Afshar 1981, pp. 1097-1108; Battle 2002). This was
different to Japan, where the US needed a successful capitalist
economic model to act as an ideological counter to China and its
socialist model and their possible influence on newly-emerging
independent Asian countries. If Japan failed to develop, other Asian
countries could turn to a non-capitalist model. This was an important reason that the US thus did not economically plunder/exploit
Japan the way it did Iran. After the Korean War, it also became
important for the US to assist the economic development of South
Korea as an alternative to the North Korean economic model.
5. Conclusion
The liberal and cultural approaches which dominate the Iranian
ideological debate in relation to development / underdevelopment
are ahistorical, lack structural analysis of Iranian – and Japanese –
society and, therefore, cannot be useful for understanding and
explaining the backwardness of the Global Periphery countries,
including Iran. The ambiguous and unclearly defined phenomenon
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of culture can, moreover, be impacted by material conditions, in a
historical context, and not vice versa. The element of culture is
responsible for neither development nor underdevelopment.
The methodological emphasis in this paper has been on the
relevance of critical theory in understanding peripheral underdevelopment in comparison to the economic-political evolution of
the developed core States. Accordingly, examining both Japan and
Iran within a historical materialist context, we argued that Japanese
development owes its success to the triumph, in the second half of
the 19th century, of the historical bloc which was able to establish its
hegemony, as defined by Gramsci. In contrast, the Iranian historical
bloc within the same period was defeated by the dominant British
and Russian imperial forces and turned into what Gramsci defined
as passive revolution. The Japanese re-emergence after the Second
World War was due to the positive role that the global hegemon,
the United States, played to keep this State within the sphere of the
capitalist hegemony via sophisticated and expensive programmes to
rebuild Japan. This course was taken by the United States in order
to preserve its hegemony in the face of the rise of a powerful
opponent potential hegemon in Asia, namely communism. On the
other hand, the Iranian historical bloc and its progressive transition
faced a violent intervention, embodied in a military coup, from the
same global hegemon after WWII. As a result, Japan can be
classified as a developed capitalist State while Iran is still struggling
with severe uneven development.
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